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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
RICK MARKHAM
Plaintiff CIVIL ACTION
v. No. 10-1363-MLB
THE BOEING COMPANY
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on defendant Boeing Company's 
motion for summary judgment (Doc. 31). The matter has been fully 
briefed and is ripe for decision (Docs. 32, 35, 44, 461). For the
reasons stated more fully herein, defendant's motion is granted in 
part and denied in part.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Rick Markham alleges that defendant discriminated 
against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act2 
("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et. seq., and further discriminated against 
him in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 
29 U.S.C. § 601, et seq., when defendant demoted him from captain, a 
supervisory position, to security officer.
1 Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply is granted. 
(Doc. 46).
2 The pretrial order in this case also alleges a claim of 
retaliation in violation of the ADA. Plaintiff, however, has now 
withdrawn that claim. (Doc. 35 at 7, n. 1).
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II. FACTS3
Plaintiff was born on November 5, 1946, and has a Master's Degree 
in Business Administration. Plaintiff was hired by defendant in May 
1989 to work as a scheduler/dispatcher. In November 1989, Boeing 
promoted plaintiff to the position of security and fire protection 
dispatcher. In February 1999, plaintiff was again promoted to the 
position of uniformed security officer. In January 2001, plaintiff 
received a promotion to the position of uniformed security officer 
manager (referred to as "captain"). Plaintiff was demoted from this 
position in January 2009, at the age of 62.
Plaintiff has a visible deformity and blindness in his right eye. 
Plaintiff's blindness affects his depth perception but has not 
affected his ability to perform his job. Plaintiff has never 
requested an accommodation from defendant due to his blindness.
In January, defendant implemented a reduction in force ("RIF") 
to combine the management structure of the fire and security 
departments. The RIF reduced the number of captains in the security 
department from three to one. The three captains in the security 
department were plaintiff, Edward Plikuhn and Valinda Hanks. At the 
time of the RIF, plaintiff was 62, Hanks was 49 and Plikuhn was 36. 
Plikuhn began his career with defendant in 2001 and had been a captain 
since 2005.
3 Several of the facts are controverted. The court views all 
controverted facts in the light most favorable, along with all 
favorable inferences, to plaintiff. See Hall v. United Parcel Serv., 
No. Civ. A. 992467-CM, 2000 WL 1114841, at *5 (D. Kan. July 31, 2000) 
(citing Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 
1998)). To the extent relevant, the factual disagreements between the 
parties will be noted.
- 2 -
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Plaintiff's supervisor, Joe Kondziola, developed a skill 
assessment matrix with the human resources department in order to 
evaluate the three captains. Kondziola selected six competencies that 
he believed were important for the position and assigned a rating from 
one to five, with five being the highest score. Plaintiff received 
the lowest rating out of the three. The scores were as follows:
Competency Plaintiff Hanks Plikuhn
1. Building a successful team 1 3 4
2. Building trust 1 2 5
3. Ethical leadership 3 3 4
4. Managing conflict 1 2 5
5. Motivating others 1 2 5
6. Security & Fire Experience 3 3 3
In addition, all captains were given a score for business goals 
and objections and performance values/leadership attributes. These 
scores were obtained from the captains' most recent performance 
review. All captains scored equally in the business goals category; 
however, plaintiff scored the lowest in the performance values 
category. The RIF procedure used in this case was set out in 
defendant's company policies for RIF procedures. The six competencies 
set out in the chart were given a combined weight of 60% of the 
captains overall score. The remaining score came from a review of the 
categories in the captains' performance reviews.
At times during plaintiff's employment as captain, Kondziola 
raised concerns with plaintiff about his performance. Kondziola's
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concerns pertained to plaintiff's inability to form and keep a team, 
his management style, inability to inspire others and his demeaning 
behavior towards his subordinates. In 2006, Human Resources 
consultant Ted Keenan found that plaintiff subjected his subordinates 
to intimidation and humiliation by calling an officer "Dumb, Dumber 
and Dumbest" and rubbing his captain's bars on his uniform and stating 
"because of these" in response to being asked about his basis for 
decisions. Plaintiff denies the findings in Keenan's report. 
Kondziola, however, cites the findings as support for his rankings in 
the matrix and his ultimate decision.
Ultimately, Kondziola decided to retain Plikuhn in the captain's 
position. On December 18, 2008, Kondziola administered plaintiff's 
annual performance review. Kondziola testified that he told plaintiff 
at this time that his position was being downgraded to that of 
security officer. Plaintiff believed Kondziola was talking about his 
performance rating being downgraded and not that he was being 
demoted.4 On January 22, 2009, plaintiff received his sixty day 
notice along with Hanks. Plaintiff spoke with Kondziola about the 
notice and was informed that Plikuhn "was still young enough to - to 
change and adapt to change" or "young enough to adapt to a change." 
Kondziola then asked plaintiff's age and, after being informed of his 
age, began speaking about retirement options. Plaintiff responded 
that he could not retire right then and Kondziola stated that he had 
reserved a position for plaintiff as a security officer. Plaintiff
4 See Plaintiff's Depo. at 47. However, plaintiff's ethics 
complaint states that Kondziola informed plaintiff in December that 
he would be receiving his sixty day lay off notice in January or 
March. (Doc. 32, exh. K).
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accepted that position.
Hanks also spoke with Kondziola about the reason she was being 
demoted from her position as captain. Hanks testified that Kondziola 
told her that she and plaintiff were too old for the position of 
captain. (Docs. 35, exh. D; 45, exh. M at 152-53). Kondziola also 
referenced her performance evaluations and employee complaints that 
occurred while she was captain. Hanks was also demoted to the 
position of security officer but she suffered a stroke prior to the 
effective date and has been on disability leave.
In May 2009, plaintiff made an internal ethics complaint alleging 
age discrimination. In October 2010, plaintiff filed his complaint 
alleging claims of age and disability discrimination. Defendant moves 
for summary judgment on all claims.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS
The rules applicable to the resolution of this case, now at the 
summary judgment stage, are well-known and are only briefly outlined 
here. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) directs the entry of 
summary judgment in favor of a party who "show[s] that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
An issue is "genuine" if sufficient evidence exists so that a rational 
trier of fact could resolve the issue either way and an issue is 
"material" if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper 
disposition of the claim. Adamson v. Multi Community Diversified 
Svcs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008). When confronted 
with a fully briefed motion for summary judgment, the court must 
ultimately determine "whether there is the need for a trial-whether,
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in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can 
be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be 
resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). If so, the court cannot grant summary 
judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. ADA Claim
The analytical framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas 
controls the court’s analysis of plaintiff’s disability discrimination 
claim because he seeks to proceed to trial on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See Johnson v. Weld 
County, Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1217 (10th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, 
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination, 
showing a genuine issue of material fact exists the following three 
elements: "(1) [he] is a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) 
[he] is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to 
perform the essential functions of the job held or desired; and (3) 
[his] employer discriminated against [him] because of [his] 
disability." Id. If plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, "the 
burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory 
reason for its employment decision. Should the defendant articulate 
a nondiscriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to plaintiff to 
show a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant’s reason 
for the discharge is pretextual." Id.
With respect to the first prong of plaintiff’s prima facie case, 
defendant begins by contending, in a footnote, that the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008 (ADAAA) is not applicable because the decision regarding
- 6 -
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plaintiff's position was made in December 2008, prior to the effective 
date of the ADAAA.5 Plaintiff, however, asserts that he was not 
informed of the decision until he received his layoff notice in 
January 2009. At this point, the evidence concerning when plaintiff 
learned of the decision is in dispute. Moreover, the actual office 
notice of plaintiff's termination from his position was not issued 
until January 2009. This fact supports a finding that some allegedly 
discriminatory conduct occurred in 2009. Therefore, the court finds 
that the ADAAA is applicable to plaintiff's claim.
The ADAAA has "lowered the bar" on the disability inquiry. 
Indeed, the ADAAA was passed in response to decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court that, according to Congress, had "created an 
inappropriately high level of limitation necessary to obtain coverage 
under the ADA," and was intended to reinstate "a broad scope of 
protection . . . available under the ADA." See Norton v. Assisted 
Living Concepts, Inc., 786 F. Supp.2d 1173, 1184 (E.D. Tex. 2011) 
(citations omitted). While an ADA plaintiff must still show that he 
has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major 
life activity, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), the ADAAA has "significantly 
expanded" the terms within that definition in favor of broad coverage. 
See id. In expanding the definition of disability, Congress intended 
to convey "that the question of whether an individual’s impairment is
5 The ADA was amended on September 25, 2008, but the amended 
version specifically became effective on January 1, 2009. ADA 
Amendment Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"), Pub.L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 
(2008). The Tenth Circuit has determined that the amendments do not 
apply retroactively. See Hennagir v. Utah Dep’t of Corr. , 587 F.3d 
1255, 1261, n. 2 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding it unnecessary to consider 
the effect of the ADA amendments because the allegedly discriminatory 
conduct occurred prior to the amendments).
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a disability under the ADA should not demand extensive analysis" and 
that the "primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA 
should be whether entities covered under the ADA have complied with 
their obligations." Id. at 1185. Consistent with this purpose, the 
implementing regulations state that the terms "substantially limiting" 
and "major" are not intended to be "demanding" standards. 29 C.F.R. 
§ 1630.2(i)(2) & (j)(1)(i) (2011).
Defendant’s argument in support of its motion for summary 
judgment on this issue asserts that plaintiff has not established that 
his impairment substantially limits the major life activity of seeing. 
Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he has no depth perception 
and that he has to turn his head 180 degrees to see to his right. 
This also affects his neck and causes frequent headaches.6 Defendant 
asserts that a loss of depth perception alone is not enough to 
establish that he is substantially limited in seeing. Plaintiff cites 
Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 144 
L. Ed.2d 518 (1999), to support the conclusion that persons with 
monocular vision - vision in only one eye - will ordinarily be found 
to be disabled. Defendant contends that Albertson's stands for the 
proposition that each case must be looked at and plaintiff must 
establish that his vision significantly affects the activity of 
seeing.
6 Plaintiff also expanded on the impact of his loss of depth 
perception in an affidavit. See doc. 35 at exh. B. Defendant asserts 
that the affidavit is a sham and was produced in order to create a 
genuine dispute of material fact. The court does not need to resolve 
this issue, however, because it has determined that a genuine dispute 
of material fact does exist on the issue of plaintiff's disability 
based on the testimony in plaintiff's deposition.
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In Albertson's, the plaintiff sued under the ADA claiming that 
because he had monocular vision, he was substantially limited in the 
major life activity of seeing. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the 
plaintiff and held that his monocular vision qualified as a disability 
because "'the manner in which [he] sees differs significantly from the 
manner in which most people see' because, 'to put it in the simplest 
terms [he] sees using only one eye; most people see using two.'" Id. 
at 564, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertson’s, Inc., 143 
F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998)) . The Supreme Court, however, 
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s per se approach. The Court noted that 
the ADA only "concerns itself only with limitations that are in fact 
substantial." Id. at 565, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (emphasis supplied). It 
therefore held that a court must take into account an individual’s 
ability to compensate for the impairment. See id. In the case of 
monocular vision, the Court said that a court should inquire into 
whether the individual’s brain has developed mechanisms to cope with 
the impairment. Although the Court acknowledged that a person with 
monocular vision will "ordinarily" be considered disabled under the 
ADA, the Court ruled that a court must determine the existence of a 
disability on a "case-by-case basis." Id. at 566-67, 119 S. Ct. 2162.
In light of the ADAAA, the court is mindful that the inquiry into 
whether or not the limitation is substantial is not meant to be 
"extensive" or demanding. The Supreme Court in Albertson's held that 
evidence that a loss of depth perception is substantial would 
establish a finding of disabled. See id. at 567. Plaintiff testified 
that he has no depth perception and must turn his head 180 degrees in 
order to look to the right. Therefore, the court concludes that
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genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether plaintiff's 
blindness constitutes a disability within the meaning of the ADA.7
Defendant next contends that plaintiff cannot establish the third 
element of his prima facie case. According to defendant, inclusion 
of plaintiff in the RIF was unrelated to his blindness. "[T]o 
establish the third element of a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination, the plaintiff must show that [he] was terminated 
because of [his] disability, or that the employer terminated the 
plaintiff 'under circumstances which give rise to an inference that 
the termination was based on [his] disability.'" Butler v. City of 
Prairie Village, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 748 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing 
Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997)). The 
third prong of the test does not impose an "onerous" burden, but it 
also is "not empty or perfunctory." Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323-24. 
Plaintiff is required "to present some affirmative evidence that 
disability was a determining factor in the employer's decision." Id.
Plaintiff argues that there is an inference of discrimination 
because Plikuhn did not have a disability and the decision maker was 
aware of plaintiff's disability. The mere fact of plaintiff's 
disability and Plikuhn's lack of a disability is not affirmative 
evidence that the disability was a determining factor in defendant's 
decision.
Plaintiff also asserts that the differences in Plikuhn's
7 The court notes that one of the requirements of plaintiff's job 
is proficient use of a firearm. The uncontroverted evidence is that 
plaintiff has met that requirement. The court doubts that a jury 
would give much credit to plaintiff's complaints regarding his vision 
disability in view of his proficiency with a firearm.
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education, experience and security clearance gives rise to an 
inference of discrimination because Plikuhn was retained instead of 
plaintiff. Kondziola, however, considered experience in making his 
decision. Kondziola did not consider education but there is no
evidence that plaintiff's master's degree would equip him to be a 
better candidate than Plikuhn who holds a bachelor's degree. With 
respect to the security clearance, the only difference between 
plaintiff and Plikuhn is plaintiff's ability to guard the President's 
plane in the event the President is in the area. The facts do not 
support the conclusion that a Yankee White Clearance is necessary for 
the position of captain.
In sum, plaintiff has failed to offer any affirmative evidence 
that his blindness was a determining factor in defendant's employment 
decision. See Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 
1997) (citing Ennis v. National Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 
F.3d 55, 59 (4th Cir.1995)). Accordingly, plaintiff has not
established the third element of his prima facie case and summary 
judgment is appropriate on this basis, regardless of whether plaintiff 
has a "disability" within the meaning of the ADA.8
B. ADEA Claim
Plaintiff may use direct or indirect evidence to demonstrate that 
defendant included him in the RIF because of his age. See Jones v. 
Okla. City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1278-79 (10th Cir. 2010); Hinds 
v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 523 F.3d 1187, 1201-02 (10th Cir. 2008);
8 Even assuming plaintiff had set forth sufficient evidence with 
respect to his prima facie case, the court would grant defendant’s 
motion for summary judgment on the ADA claim because plaintiff has 
failed to raise any inference of pretext.
- 11 -
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Cortez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 460 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir.2006). 
Direct evidence demonstrates on its face that defendant demoted 
plaintiff because of age. See Sanders v. Sw. Bell Tel., L.P., 544 
F.3d 1101, 1105 (10th Cir.2008), cert. denied 130 S. Ct. 69 (2009).
Plaintiff first asserts that he has established direct evidence 
of age discrimination. Plaintiff points to two different statements. 
First, Hanks testified that when she asked Kondziola why she and 
plaintiff were not retained in the position of captain Kondziola 
responded that it was because they were "too old."9 Second, Kondziola 
asked plaintiff his age after telling plaintiff his decision to 
include plaintiff in the RIF and also made the comment that Plikuhn 
was young enough to adapt to change.
The second statement made directly to plaintiff does not 
constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. After asking
9 Defendant argues that the court should not consider this 
statement because Hanks has given inconsistent testimony. Hanks made 
this statement an affidavit and was then subsequently deposed. In the 
beginning of her deposition, Hanks testified that Kondziola made a 
comment about plaintiff and Hanks being in their sixties and Plikuhn 
being in his forties. Towards the end of the deposition, counsel 
specifically asked Hanks about the statement in her affidavit. Hanks 
then testified that the statement in her affidavit was correct and 
that Kondziola told her that she and plaintiff were too old.
Defendant asks the court to disregard Hanks' statement regarding 
the "too old" comment because she didn't "recall" the statement early 
in her deposition. This the court cannot do. The court does not 
"assess the credibility of [potential] conflicting testimony" on 
summary judgment. Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1557 
(10th Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) 
("Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the 
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, 
not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment or for a directed verdict.")); Zia Trust Co. ex rel. Causey 
v. Montoya, 597 F.3d 1150, 1153 (10th Cir. 2010)(same).
Moreover, the court is required to view all evidence in a light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party at this stage of the 
proceedings.
- 12 -
Case 6:10-cv-01363-MLB Document 47 Filed 12/14/11 Page 13 of 17
plaintiff his age, Kondziola began discussion retirement options with 
plaintiff. The question regarding plaintiff's age could be construed 
as Kondziola's attempt to help plaintiff determine if he was eligible 
for retirement at that time. "A statement that can plausibly be 
interpreted two different ways-one discriminatory and the other 
benign-does not directly reflect illegal animus, and, thus, does not 
constitute direct evidence." Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 476 F.3d 
847, 855 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). Moreover, Kondizola's 
statement regarding Plikuhn being young enough to adapt to change does 
not directly imply that his decision to choose Plikuhn was because he 
believed that plaintiff was too told for the position. At most, this 
statement is evidence of indirect discrimination.
The statement made to Hanks by Kondziola, however, is another 
matter. To constitute direct evidence of age discrimination, "the 
evidence must be from the decision-maker, must relate directly to the 
adverse action at issue, and must contain an acknowledgment of 
discriminatory intent or reveal a propensity to make decisions based 
on unlawful criteria." Cuenca v. University of Kansas, 265 F.Supp.2d 
1191, 1205 (D. Kan. 2003)(citing Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 
Inc. , 220 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2000); Chatfield v. Shilling 
Const. Co., Inc., 232 F.3d 900, 2000 WL 1531846, *2 (10th Cir. 2000)). 
This statement was made by Kondziola, undisputedly the sole decision­
maker, and was in direct response to a question asking why the 
decision was made to include plaintiff in the RIF. Moreover, it did 
reveal a decision made based on age, an unlawful criteria.
Therefore, plaintiff has established a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether he was in fact included in the RIF because
- 13 -
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of his age. See Peterson v. Wilmur Communications, Inc., 205 F. 
Supp.2d 1014, 1024 (E.D. Wis. 2002)("For example, direct evidence is 
found where a letter of demotion from the decision maker states that 
because plaintiff is a member of the World Church of the Creator, a 
White supremacist political organization ... employees cannot have 
confidence in the objectivity of [his] training, evaluation, or 
supervision when [he] must compare Whites to non-Whites.")
Even if the court had not determined the statement to be direct 
evidence of discrimination, the court would find a genuine dispute of 
material fact exists as to whether there is indirect evidence of age 
discrimination. Turning to the indirect evidence analysis, which is 
based on the McDonnell-Douglas framework, defendant does not contend 
that plaintiff has failed to make his prima facie case. Rather, 
defendant asserts that plaintiff cannot establish pretext.
Evidence of pretext can take a variety of forms. See Aramburu 
v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1411 n. 10 (10th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff 
can show pretext by pointing to "such weaknesses, implausibilities, 
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s 
proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact 
finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence." Morgan v. 
Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations 
omitted). In a RIF case, a plaintiff typically can demonstrate 
pretext with evidence that (1) his termination does not accord with 
the RIF criteria; (2) defendant deliberately falsified or manipulated 
the RIF criteria in order to terminate him; or (3) the RIF was 
generally pretextual. See Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 
440 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir.2006).
- 14 -
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Regardless how plaintiff goes about showing pretext, he must show 
"that something more nefarious might be at play," not just that 
defendant "got it wrong." Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 
(10th Cir.2010). Mere conjecture that the employer’s explanation is 
pretext is insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Satterlee v. 
Allen Press, Inc., 443 F. Supp.2d 1236, 1245 (D. Kan. 2006). In 
examining whether defendant’s proffered reason is pretextual, the 
Court must "look at the facts as they appear to the person making the 
decision to terminate plaintiff." Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 
Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000). The Court’s role is not 
to second guess an employer’s business judgment. Stover v. Martinez, 
382 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2004).
While defendant's RIF criteria and plaintiff's evaluations 
support the decision to include plaintiff in the RIF, the court must 
also look to the age-based statements allegedly made by the decision­
maker at the time the layoff notices were received. Both plaintiff 
and Hanks testified that Kondziola made age-based statements after 
being told about the layoff. Plaintiff was told he was being laid off 
and replaced with a younger worker. Kondziola then asked about 
plaintiff's age and inquired into retirement possibilities. Kondziola 
also stated that Plikuhn, who was 36, was young enough to adapt to 
changes. In addition, Kondziola told Hanks, in response to her 
question of why she and plaintiff were being laid off and Plikuhn was 
retained, that she and plaintiff were too old.
To indirectly establish pretext through such statements, 
plaintiff must show some nexus between the discriminatory statements 
and the employment decision. Walker v. Faith Techs., Inc., 344 F.
- 15 -
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Supp.2d 1261, 1277 (D. Kan. 2004). "Age-related comments referring 
directly to the worker may support an inference of age 
discrimination." Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n , 14 F.3d 526, 
531 (10th Cir.1994). In this case, Kondizola's alleged statements 
about plaintiff being too old for the position of captain, if made, 
does bear the necessary nexus to plaintiff’s termination as the 
statement was made in conjunction with the receipt of the layoff 
notice. Kondizola's statements concerning plaintiff's retirement age 
and that Pilkuhn was young enough to adapt to change also were made 
directly at plaintiff in conjunction with the receipt of the layoff 
notice.
The evidence, while far from overwhelming, is enough to create 
a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether plaintiff was 
included in the RIF because of his age. Therefore, defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on plaintiff's ADEA claim must be denied.
V. CONCLUSION
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted in part and 
denied in part. (Doc. 31). This case is set for status conference 
on Monday, February 27 at 1:30 p.m. and set for jury trial on Tuesday, 
March 6 at 9:00 a.m.
A motion for reconsideration of this order is not encouraged. 
Any such motion shall not exceed 3 double-spaced pages and shall 
strictly comply with the standards enunciated by this court in Comeau 
v. Rupp, 810 F. Supp. 1172, 1174 (1992). The response to any motion 
for reconsideration shall not exceed 3 double-spaced pages. No reply 
shall be filed.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this 14th day of December 2011, at Wichita, Kansas.
s/ Monti Belot 
Monti L. Belot 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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